Will an Information effects-domain AMO be employed in an irregular seizure or retention of power within five years of one first being fielded by a G-20 state?

Prediction market on metaculus. Shaping an opposing commander's perception through [military deception](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_deception) is a long-standing practice, combining physical [decoys](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decoy), false electronic signatures, and strikes on the sensors, command posts, and communications links an enemy relies on. In the war in Ukraine, both sides field convincing dummy systems, such as wooden and inflatable HIMARS launchers and air-defence batteries, [to draw enemy fire and distort their targeting picture](https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/april/decoy-warfare-lessons-and-implication-war-ukraine), while the [suppression of enemy air defences](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suppression_of_Enemy_Air_Defenses) blinds the sensors a commander depends on. Such effects are planned and synchronised by human staffs, with automation confined to individual tools rather than the design of the deception itself. As of 2026, no system that autonomously coordinates deception, information effects, and strikes to shape an adversary commander's decisions has been operationally fielded.

Resolves: 12/31/2040.