Will a Cognitive-domain AMC be employed in an irregular seizure or retention of power within five years of one first being fielded by a G-20 state?

Prediction market on metaculus. Influence and [propaganda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propaganda) operations increasingly rely on automation to generate and spread content at scale. Networks of [automated and fake accounts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_bot) amplify messaging and fabricate the appearance of grassroots support, while [deepfakes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepfake) and synthetic personas are used to deceive audiences. State-linked operations such as Russia's Doppelganger and China's [Spamouflage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spamouflage) have [used generative AI to produce and translate content across multiple languages and platforms](https://www.csoonline.com/article/2134290/openai-accuses-russia-china-iran-and-israel-of-misusing-its-genai-tools-for-covert-ops.html), though with limited measurable impact. These campaigns remain directed by human operators, who set the narratives, audiences, and timing. As of 2026, no system capable of autonomously planning and executing an influence operation against an audience from a high-level objective has been operationally fielded.

Resolves: 12/31/2034.